If one cut one [of the organs of the throat] in the case of a bird, or both organs in the case of cattle, the slaughtering is valid. The greater part of an organ is equivalent to [the whole of] it. Rabbi Judah says: he must cut through the veins. [If one cut] half of one organ in the case of a bird, or one and a half organs in the case of cattle, the slaughtering is invalid. [If one man cut] the greater part of one organ in the case of a bird, or the greater part of each organ in the case of cattle, the slaughtering is valid.

If one slaughtered two animals simultaneously, the slaughtering is valid. If two persons held the knife and slaughtered, even if one cut higher up and the other cut lower down [in the neck], the slaughtering is valid.

If he chopped off the head with one stroke, the slaughtering is invalid. He was slaughtering and he cut through the neck with one stroke, if the knife was as long as the neck, the slaughtering is valid. If he was slaughtering and he cut off two heads at the same time, if the knife is as long as the neck it is valid. When is this so? When the slaughterer moved the knife forward and not backward, or backward and not forward; but if he moved the knife to and fro, however small it was, even if it was a scalpel, the slaughtering is valid. If a knife fell down and slaughtered [an animal], even though it slaughtered it in the proper way, the slaughtering is invalid, for it is said, "And you shall slaughter and eat," that which you slaughter, you may eat. If [while slaughtering] the knife fell and he picked it up, if his clothes fell and he picked them up, if he sharpened the knife, or if he got tired and his friend came and [continued] slaughtering, if he delayed the time that it takes to slaughter, it is invalid. Rabbi Shimon says: if he delayed the time it takes to examine the slaughtering.

If one first sliced the esophagus and then cut away the windpipe, or first cut away the windpipe and then sliced the esophagus; or if he sliced one of these organs and paused until the animal died; or if he thrust the knife underneath the second organ and cut it: [In all these cases] Rabbi Yeshevav says: the animal is nevelah; Rabbi Akiva says: it is terefah. Rabbi Yeshevav stated this general rule in the name of Rabbi Joshua: whenever an animal is rendered invalid by a fault in the slaughtering it is nevelah; whenever an animal has been duly slaughtered but is rendered invalid by some other defect it is terefah. And Rabbi Akiba [ultimately] agreed with him.

If one slaughtered cattle or a wild beast or a bird and no blood came out, they are valid and may be eaten by him whose hands have not been washed, for they have not been rendered susceptible to impurity by blood. Rabbi Shimon says: they have been rendered susceptible to impurity by the slaughtering.

One who slaughtered a dying animal: Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: [the slaughtering is invalid] unless it jerked its foreleg and its hind leg. Rabbi Eliezer says: it is enough if it spurted [the blood]. Rabbi Shimon said: even if one slaughtered [a dying animal] by night and the following morning he got up early and found the sides [of the throat] full of blood, the slaughtering is valid, for this proves that it spurted [the blood], as is Rabbi Eliezer's measure. The sages say: [the slaughtering is invalid] unless it jerked either its foreleg or its hind leg, or it moved its tail to and fro. This is the test both with regard to large and small animals. If a small animal stretched out its foreleg [at the end of the slaughtering] but did not withdraw it, [the slaughtering] is invalid, for this was just an indication of the expiration of its life. When do these rules apply? To case of an animal which was believed to be dying. But if it was believed to be sound, even though it did not show any of these signs, the slaughtering is valid.

If one slaughtered for a non-Jew, the slaughtering is valid. Rabbi Eliezer declares it invalid. Rabbi Eliezer said: even if one slaughtered a beast with the intention that a non-Jew should eat [only] its liver, the slaughtering is invalid, for the thoughts of a non-Jew are usually directed towards idolatry. Rabbi Yose said: is there not a kal vehomer argument? For if in the case of consecrated animals, where a wrongful intention can render invalid, it is established that everything depends solely upon the intention of him who performs the service, how much more in the case of unconsecrated animals, where a wrongful intention cannot render invalid, is it not logical that everything should depend solely upon the intention of him who slaughters!

If one slaughtered [an animal] as a sacrifice to mountains, hills, seas, rivers, or deserts, the slaughtering is invalid. If two persons held a knife and slaughtered [an animal], one intending it as a sacrifice to one of these things and the other for a legitimate purpose, the slaughtering is invalid.

One may not slaughter [so that the blood runs] into the sea or into rivers, or into vessels, But one may slaughter into a pool (or vessel) of water. And when on board a ship on to vessels. One may not slaughter at all into a hole, but one may dig a hole in his own house for the blood to run into. In the street, however, he should not do so as not to follow the ways of the heretics.

If one slaughtered [an unconsecrated animal outside the Temple court] for it to be an olah or a shelamim or an asham for a doubtful sin or as a Pesah or a todah, the slaughtering is invalid. But Rabbi Shimon declares it valid. If two persons held one knife and slaughtered [an unconsecrated animal outside the Temple court], one declaring it to be one of the above and the other intending it for a legitimate purpose, the slaughtering is invalid. If one slaughtered [an unconsecrated animal outside the Temple court] for it to be a hatat or an asham or a first-born or the tithe [of cattle] or a substitute offering, the slaughtering is valid. This is the general rule: if one slaughtered an animal declaring it to be a sacrifice which can be brought either as a voluntary or a freewill-offering it is invalid, but if he declares it to be a sacrifice which cannot be brought either as a votive or a freewill-offering it is valid.